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1 Introduction
In the past few decades there have been astonish-
ing social gains for some poor groups in the world,
but much weaker gains and even retrogression for
others. Consider the following:
In East Asia the numbers of people in poverty fell
by half between the mid-1970s and the mid-
1990s, and the proportion living on less than a
dollar a day (at 1985 Purchasing Power Panty
IPPP] exchange rates) fell from six out of ten to
two out of ten people. In sub-Saharan Africa,
there is simply not enough information to make
even an empirically based statement along the
same lines, but there is a high probability that
both the proportion and the absolute numbers in
poverty increased in this period. More recently,
in all regions outside East Asia, the numbers of
poor increased between 1987 and 1993.
Infant mortality in 1970 was about the same -
at 140 per thousand live births in the three
high-mortality regions of the Middle East and
North Africa, South Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa, but by 1995 had fallen, at very different
rates, respectively to 54, 75 and 92 in these
three regions.
Almost everywhere primary and secondary
school enrolment rates have steadily risen,
even in periods of stagnation and decline. Sub-
Saharan Africa is the exception, with the gross
primary enrolment rate actually falling from
80% in 1980 to 72% in 1993.
The Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
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Development (OECD) has set goals for future social
progress, reflecting the priorities established by the
international community in recent years. We shall
refer to them as the 'Strategy 21' goals. The core
goals are as follows:2
Economic well-being
The proportion of people living in extreme
poverty in developing countries should be
reduced by at least one half by 2015.
Social development
There should be universal primary enrolment in
all countries by 2015.
Progress toward gender equality and the
empowerment of women should be demon-
strated by eliminating gender disparity in pri-
mary and secondary education by 2005.
The death rate for infants and children under
the age of five years should be reduced in each
developing country by two thirds of the 1990
level by 2015. The rate of maternal mortality
should be reduced by three fourths during the
same period.
Access should be available through the primary
health care system to reproductive health ser-
vices for all individuals of appropriate ages,
including safe and reliable family planning
methods, as soon as possible and no later than
the year 2015.
Environmental sustainability and
regeneration
There should be a current national Strategy for
Sustainable Development in the process of
implementation in every country by 2005, so as
to ensure that current trends in the loss of envi-
ronmental resources are effectively reversed at
both global and national levels by 2015.
Will these goals be achieved? What is the role of
overall economic growth, policy choices and insti-
tutional factors in determining this? These are
immensely complicated questions. In this article we
explore some of the quantitative dimensions of the
Z OECD Development Assistance Committee (1996: pp.
9-11).
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task of reaching two important goals: reducing by
half the incidence of extreme poverty and by two
thirds the rate of child mortality, both by 2015. We
find that the evidence is mixed. Recent history and
predicted growth imply that many countries will
indeed halve their poverty rates by 2015. But many
will not - including most of the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. The goal for child mortality is found
to be even less attainable. We conclude that for both
goals to be substantially achieved, considerably
more effort is needed today in improved economic
management, and in increased public and private
efforts to improve the social conditions of the pop-
ulation at large.
The article is organised as follows. First, we outline
the nature and (multiple) dimensions of poverty in
the developing world today Second, we explore the
required growth to achieve poverty reduction tar-
gets, under alternative assumptions for the distrib-
ution of income or consumption. Third, we look at
the relationship between incomes and social indica-
tors, focusing especially on child mortality And
fourth, we discuss the advantages and disadvan-
tages of an approach that emphasises government
spending targets on social spending, as a means of
reaching targets for outcomes.
2 Poverty and Inequality:
Dimensions and Trends
In the early 1990s some 30% of the developing world
lived on less than one dollar a day (in 1985
Purchasing Power Parity terms). The bulk of these
people were in South and East Asia, the two most
populous regions of the world. But sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia have the greatest incidence of
poverty Both have about two fifths of their population
living on less than a dollar a day, and both have large
poverty 'gaps' - the average distance between con-
sumption by the poor and the poverty line, expressed
as a percentage of the poverty line (Table 1).
The number of people living in extreme poverty
has increased in the developing world (Table 1).
East Asia, however, is a notable exception. Its suc-
cess in reducing poverty has been dramatic, and
has continued into the mid-1990s (Ahuja et al.,
Table 1: Population living on less than one dollar a day in developing economies, 1987 and 1993
Source: World Bank 1996
1997). The proportion of the population living on
less than a dollar a day fell from 60% in the mid-
1970s to only 20% in the mid-1990s, with a sharp
fall between 1993 and 1995, notably in China.
The numbers of the poor in East Asia fell from
over 700 million to less than 350 million over just
two decades. Such a reduction in absolute poverty
must be unprecedented in history Although
recent events and financial turbulence have
undoubtedly stalled progress in the region, they
are unlikely to undo completely the substantial
gains that have been achieved over recent
decades.3
These figures on the extent of world poverty repre-
sent only a very partial account of poverty Apart
from issues of data quality and coverage, there are
two features of the concept of poverty that need to
be emphasised. First, poverty has to be related to
societal norms of the levels of consumption, ser-
vices and other features of living that are consid-
ered the minimum necessary for decent
participation in society Norms vary considerably
across societies, and in particular tend to be higher,
the greater the overall level of material well-being.
In a recent analysis in Britain in which a poverty
line was developed from surveying the views of
individuals on what was necessary for normal liv-
ing, 'necessities' included an inside toilet, a refrig-
erator, carpets, a washing-machine and insurance
of home contents (Gordon and Pantazis 1997).
Recent estimates by Manuelyan and Walton(1998)
suggest that Indonesia will be the hardest hit by the
crisis, effectively losing a decade of progress in poverty
reduction.
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These would be considered features of affluence n
most African and Asian societies.
'International' poverty lines, such as the commonly
used 'dollar-a-day', are customarily used only to
make international comparisons or aggregations of
consumption-based poverty Country analysis
always makes use of poverty lines relevant to the
country and frequently uses a range of poverty lines
to reflect the varying degrees of poverty - and a
range of measures of the depth and severity of
poverty For middle-income countries poverty lines
are frequently closer to about two dollars a day If
this is applied to the world's population, some 2.8
billion people lived in poverty in the early 1990s -
including a majority of those in most of South Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa.
Second, poverty has many dimensions. Inadequate
consumption is a core dimension, but many other
features can be important, including ill-health, illit-
eracy, lack of access to basic services, insecurity
powerlessness, social or physical isolation, and vul-
nerability to violence. We take measures of two of
these dimensions - mortality and educational status
- to illustrate the global situation (Table 2).
Mortality of children is particularly sensitive to
overall well-being. There are vast differences across
countries: on average 157 out of 1,000 children die
in sub-Saharan Africa before the age of five (92
These and other data (unless otherwise referenced)
come from World Bank (1997).
Millions Share of
population (%)
Poverty
gap (%)
Region 1987 1993 1987 1993 1993
East Asia and Pacific 464.0 445.8 28.8 26.0 7.8
Europe and Central Asia 2.2 14.5 0.6 3.5 1.1
Latin America and Caribbean 91.2 109.6 22.0 23.5 9.1
Middle East and North Africa 10.3 10.7 4.7 4.1 0.6
South Asia 479.9 514.7 45.4 43.1 12.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 179.6 218.6 38.5 39.1 15.3
Total 1,227.2 1,313.9 30.1 29.4 9.2
Table 2: Indicators of education and mortality
Source; World Bank, 1997
before the age of one).4 In many African countries,
including Angola, Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, the under-five mortality rate exceeds 200.
This compares with an under-five mortality of 53
in East Asia and nine in high income countries (six
in Japan and Singapore, but 10 in the United
States). If we take the high income mortality rate as
an achievable benchmark, then some nine million
children die each year before the age of five from
avoidable deaths. Mortality is related to national
income (this is further discussed later) but with
regional and country-specific variations. As a gen-
eral statement South and East Asia have relatively
low mortality rates, and sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East relatively high mortality rates for their
levels of income (Figure 1). Over the past two and
a half decades every region has experienced large
Figure 1: Regional under-5 mortality by GNP per capita (US $)
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reductions in infant mortality, despite, in some
cases, stagnant incomes. But the pace of decline
has varied, with relatively rapid progress in East
Asia, Latin America and the Middle East and North
Africa, and slower gains in South Asia and (espe-
cially) sub-Saharan Africa.
Outside sub-Saharan Africa, the bulk of the devel-
oping world has now achieved close to universal
primary education enrolment, though with signifi-
cant drop-out rates even before completing primary
school. Sub-Saharan Africa on average went back-
wards between 1980, when the gross primary
enrolment rate was 80%, and 1993, when it had
fallen to 72%. Most of the developing world has far
from universal secondary enrolment (Table 2). As a
consequence of past education, many adults in the
Europe &
C. Asia
Latin America
GNP per
capita
capita
Secondary
school
enrolment
(gross %)
Under-5
mortality
rate (per
1,000 births)
Infant mortality rate
(per 1,000 births)
Region 1995 1993 1995 1970 1980 1990 1995
East Asia and Pacific 800 55 53 80 56 45 40
Europe and Central Asia 2,220 86 35 71 50 30 26
Latin America and Caribbean 3,320 51 47 85 62 43 37
Middle East and North Africa 1,780 59 72 137 99 62 54
South Asia 350 n.a. 116 140 122 90 75
Sub-Saharan Africa 490 24 157 138 115 99 92
High Income 24,930 97 9 26 13 8 7
Table 3: Inequality in various regions in the 1990s (average Gini coefficient)
Source: Deininger and Squire 1996
developing world have little or no education: some
25% of those in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa
have had no schooling, over 75% at most only some
primary But there are even larger differences in the
dynamics, with many East Asian and Latin
American countries in the middle of a swift, upward
transformation in the educational structure of the
adult population, owing to past schooling efforts.
This will have an important influence on other
social goals, such as child mortality, and on the
capacity of economies to move into more sophisti-
cated patterns of production of goods and services.
Inequality between and within societies is both an
influence on poverty and, for many, a concern in its
own right. With the major exception of East Asia,
differences between nations have been rising over
the long term. By one estimate the ratio of income
per person between the richest and poorest country
has increased from 11 in 1870 to 38 in 1960 and to
52 in 1985 (Pritchett 1997). This is associated with
huge differences between groups. The ratio of wage
earnings of engineers in Frankfurt, Germany were
56 times those of female unskilled textile workers in
Nairobi in 1994 - after allowing for differences in
purchasing power (World Bank 1995). And even
unskilled textile workers in Nairobi were almost
certainly living in households significantly above
the poverty line -. in 1992 the 42% of Kenyans esti-
mated to be living below the national poverty line
were mostly dependent on rural or urban informal
sources of livelihood.
Inequality within societies is both lower and more
stable over time than international inequality, but
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (1997), Employment Outlook.
79
concerns over inequality are clearly on the agenda
in many countries in the late 1990s. There are
major differences in the degree of inequality
between countries. In South Africa, the top 10% of
households account for almost 50% of total house-
hold consumption spending, while the bottom 10%
accounts for just over 1%. By contrast, in Hungary
the top 10% of households account for 23% of total
spending, and the bottom 10% for 4% of the total.
On the basis of one commonly used index of over-
all inequality - the Gini coefficient - Eastern
European, high income and South Asian countries
are relatively equal, while Latin American and sub-
Saharan African countries are relatively unequal
(though with wide variations within sub-Saharan
Africa); East Asia and the Middle East fall in
between (Table 3).
Are countries becoming more unequal? In general
the distribution of income (or spending) changes
slowly Brazil has been extraordinarily unequal for
decades; India and Indonesia are relatively equal
and have experienced little change in the overall
distribution of consumption across households -
most groups have gained from overall growth
roughly in proportion to their initial share in the
national pie. While there have been shifts in
inequality in some countries, it is hard to discern an
overall pattern to changes. But there are some
changes occurring that are of particular interest. In
rich countries the rise in earnings' inequality in a
few countries, including the United States, the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, has been a
major source of debate, though there is little sign of
widening inequality in most other countries.5 In
Region Index of inequality
Eastern Europe 28.94
South Asia 31.88
High income countries 33.75
East Asia and the Pacific 38.09
Middle East and North Africa 38.03
Sub-Saharan Africa 46.95
Latin America and the Caribbean 49.31
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union some
countries are experiencing rises in income differ-
ences from initially low levels. There are strikingly
large increases in the case of Russia. In Latin
America, Chile experienced worsening inequality in
the 1970s, Mexico experienced widening income
differences in the 1980s, and even Brazil suffered a
further increase in inequality between 1980 and
1995, But perhaps of greatest interest are develop-
ments in East Asia, a region that has in the past
been heralded as a model of growth with equity.6 In
some economies, including China, Hong Kong,
Malaysia and Thailand, there have been significant
increases in inequality, especially in the past 10 or
15 years; in Malaysia's case this comes after a period
of significantly falling inequality between 1973 and
1989. A full analysis of the causes of these changes
has not yet been undertaken, but the current evi-
dence indicates that it is associated with rising dif-
ferences between high and low-skilled groups,
between rural and urban areas, and between richer
and poorer regions (Ahuja et al. 1997).
3 Growth Requirements for
Future Poverty Reduction
'What will be required to reduce poverty significantly
in the future, and to achieve the goals set by Strategy
21? We explore in this section the relationship
between future poverty declines, future economic
growth and inequality Income poverty outcomes are
a function of the overall level of economic growth
and the extent to which the poor participate in
growth. In other words, forecasting poverty is a prod-
uct of forecasting overall growth and changes in
inequality Both are hazardous undertakings. Growth
forecasts are notoriously unreliable. And while there
have been some recent changes in inequality that are
of great interest, there is no basis for predicting any
general rise or fall in inequality In most communities
the poor have participated in economic growth
roughly in proportion to their initial share in national
income or spending. Accordingly we adopt the fol-
lowing approach. First, we present estimates of the
growth rate in average consumption per person that
would be required to achieve the Strategy 21 goal.
This exercise is done using two 'international'
poverty lines of one and two dollars-a-day (in 1985
PPP terms) that span most national poverty lines
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commonly used in low- and middle-income coun-
tries. This is achieved assuming no change in the dis-
tribution of expenditure or income. We then
compare this with various economic growth fore-
casts. Finally, we explore the implications of rises or
falls in inequality for a few countries, to illustrate the
potential influence of this factor.
While the DAC '2 ist Century Initiative' speaks of
halving the extreme poverty by 2015, it does not
specify the base year. Assuming that the goal is to
halve the 1990 incidence of extreme poverty,
Strategy 21 is to be achieved over 25 years.
Therefore, for each country, we estimate what is the
required growth in consumption per capita to halve
poverty over a 25-year period.7 The starting points
for each country vary, since the surveys used to
derive the base line were conducted at different
points in time (though generally centering on
1990/91). This experiment is consistent with the
spirit of the Strategy 21 poverty goal, even though
the target date will not be 2015 for every country
There is no simple relationship between per capita
growth requirements, initial poverty and the pattern
of income distribution. However, in general the
higher the initial poverty rate and the greater the ini-
tial inequality, the higher will be the per capita
growth required to cut poverty incidence in half over
25 years. Take two middle income countries: Brazil
and Tunisia. Brazil is slightly richer but much more
unequal. It would require a growth rate (in per capita
consumption) of 2.5% per annum to reduce by half
the proportion living on less than one dollar a day,
and 3% for the proportion living below two dollars a
day (Table 4). Tunisia is more equal and so has a
lower initial poverty rate, and would require a much
lower rate of per capita growth of 0.8 and 1.3% per
annum respectively to achieve these targets. India,
which is much poorer but more equal than Brazil,
would require an annual per capita growth rate of
1.4% to reach the target at one dollar a day, but 5%
at two dollars a day Zambia, even poorer and more
unequal than India, would require even higher
growth rates.
If we compare these required growth rates with
recent growth experience we get a generally pes-
simistic, but highly varied result across countries. In
6 See, for example, World Bank (1993). This analysis is based on Ravallion and Chen (1998).
Table 4: Growth in per capita consumption required to halve poverty incidence over 25 years,
selected countries
Source: Ravallion and Chen 1998
Figure 4 the required growth in per capita con-
sumption is plotted against recent historical growth
during 1990-95 for all the countries for which we
have satisfactory data. Those above the diagonal
line had faster growth than required, those below
slower. While some were growing much faster than
the rate required to reach Strategy 21 goals (most
East Asian countries), the majority were not grow-
ing fast enough, and many were experiencing nega-
tive per capita growth and consequently increases
in poverty incidence.
4
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At a poverty line of PPP$1 per person per day,
recent growth rates indicate that the Strategy 21
goal would indeed be met in the 'big three' Asian
countries: China, India, and Indonesia (countries
with the largest numbers in poverty). It would also
be just within reach of Brazil (another country
with large numbers in poverty), if recent growth is
a guide to the future. From the perspective of the
world's population in poverty, the Strategy 21
poverty reduction goal would certainly be
achieved if future growth followed recent trends.
Figure 2: Average annual per capita private consumption growth (1990-95) and annual per capita
growth required to halve poverty incidence ($1/day) over 25year period
8
0 1 2 3 4 5
Required per capita growth to reduce poverty by half (% pa)
6
Country Average Gini Population Annual per Population Annual per
spending under capita growth under capita growth
per capita $1/day required to $2/day required to
(1985 PPP $) (%) halve poverty (%) halve poverty
(%) (%)
Brazil 151 61.5 23.6 2.5 43.5 3.1
India 38 37.7 52.5 1.4 88.8 5.0
Tunisia 138 40.2 3.9 0.8 22.7 1.3
Zambia 16 46.2 84.6 4.9 98.1 7.1
Table 5: Actual and projected regional per capita growth rates
Source: Ravallion and Chen 1998; World Bank staff projections as of early 1998
But a different picture emerges if the concern is
with the number of countries which achieve the
goal. More than half the countries are shown (in
Figure 2) to fall short of the goal at a poverty line
of PPP$ 1/day The choice of poverty line, however,
matters in assessing the achievement of the
Strategy 21 poverty goal. At PPP$2 per person per
day past growth in India and Brazil is no longer
sufficient to halve poverty over 25 years.8
In terms of regional averages the situation is partic-
ularly difficult in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 5),
where the required growth is relatively high, and
experience worse than elsewhere. Note that
required growth rates in aggregate GDP are higher
than in per capita consumption owing to popula-
tion growth, and can be higher where investment
rates need to be increased to achieve higher
growth.9 All of these effects are particularly impor-
tant for sub-Saharan Africa.
Taking growth in per capita incomes over the recent
past, however, may not be a reliable guide to future
prospects. For some countries recent growth rates
will not be sustainable over the longer term, either
because of favourable temporary shocks (improve-
ment in terms of trade or external transfers), or
because policies (such as fiscal and monetary pol-
icy) are not sustainable. For others, recent growth
rates may be untypically low, because of
unfavourable shocks, or the effects of policy transi-
tion. How can we best approximate the longer-run
The Strategy 21 goal refers to 'extreme poverty', which
suggests that the $1 a day benchmark would be the
more appropriate.
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growth potential of these countries to make judge-
ments about the attainability of Strategy 21? We
base our growth predictions on those factors which
past experience suggests are significantly related to
economic growth. For this, we make use of a grow-
ing body of literature which seeks to explain eco-
nomic growth using cross-section evidence.
Typically, explanations for variations in real per
capita income growth rates across countries are
found largely in differences in the initial conditions
and policy choices of countries. Those with more
favorable initial conditions achieve higher growth
rates. Are current 'initial' conditions and policy
choices in the developing world conducive to accel-
erated growth, and to a large reduction in income
poverty? While considerable caution is necessary in
interpreting causative processes - and even more
caution is needed in using these results for projec-
tions - they at least provide an illustration of how
the future may look.
Our exploration of plausible per capita growth
prospects of 36 developing countries for which data
were available is based on the work by Barro
(1991), and a more recent extension by Sachs and
Warner (1995). The latter use a very simple classi-
fication of economies in terms of a 'good' and 'poor'
economic policy stance and political conditions to
'explain' variations in per capita growth. The very
simplicity of their approach is useful for the present
purpose, that is, essentially illustrative. By taking
current levels of the right-hand-side variables used
Investment rates would also have to increase if the
balance of payments current account is unsustainably in
deficit.
Region ($1/day) ($2/day)
Actual
1991-95
Projected
1997-2000
East Asia 1.2 1.9 6.9 2.7
Europe and Central Asia 0,8 1.2 0.7 2.4
Latin America 1.8 2.7 2.0 1.9
Middle East and N. Africa 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.3
South Asia 1.3 4.5 1.9 3.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 3.3 -1.3 1.1
Per capita growth rate Real consumption per
required to reduce capita growth rate (%)
poverty by half (%)
Figure 3: Required and predicted per capita growth under existing policies to reduce poverty by
half (% p.a.)
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by Sachs and Warner (including the dummy vari-
able they used - O for good policy and 1 for bad
policy), and applying them to the cross-section rela-
tionship they estimate, predicted values of GDP per
capita growth can be generated for the period
1990-2015. Details of how these predictions were
made are given in Demery and Walton (1998).
Figures 3 and 4 compare annual growth in real
GDP per capita as predicted by the SachsWarner
equation (assuming the latest available right-hand-
side variables) with the growth rate (in real con-
sumption per capita) required to halve poverty
over 25 years. Figure 3 is based on the economic
situation in each country which existed in 1990 (as
reported in the BarroLee 1994 data base). This
gives predicted per capita growth assuming a con-
tinuation of the existing economic policy stance.
Under this scenario, only half of the 36 countries
are predicted to achieve the growth required for the
Strategy 21 poverty goal. This would be an overes-
timate if real consumption growth lags behind real
GDP growth (which will occur if investment ratios
must rise in order to raise growth rates or restore
° The recent financial crisis in Indonesia might call into
question its ability to halve the incidence in poverty
From a 1995 base, per capita consumption needs to
grow at just 0.5% per annum to reduce poverty
incidence by a half 25 years later. Whether this modest
Kenya
BrziIf Zambia
1 2 3 4 5
Required per capita growth to reduce poverty by half (% pa)
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external balances). Note, the 'big three' of Asia
(China, India and Indonesia)'° are predicted to
grow sufficiently to achieve the Strategy 21 poverty
goal, but Brazil is now shown as unlikely to do so.
Figure 4 then assumes that governments improve
economic policies during the projection period
(essentially switching the policy variable from 'poor'
to 'good' for all countries). Under this assumption,
as many as 28 of the 36 countries are now predicted
to meet the target. Interestingly, these include a
number of African countries (such as Kenya,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe). The message is clear.
Whether or not poverty incidence will be halved by
2015 depends in part on how well economies are
managed. The evidence from the cross-country
regressions is that improved economic policy
enhances growth prospects and the attainability of
Strategy 21 goals. Interestingly enough, only three
(out of 16) countries identified in the Barro and Lee
1994 data base as having 'good' economic policies
are predicted not to grow sufficiently quickly to
halve the incidence of poverty Only four of the 20
countries characterised by 'bad' policies are pre-
goal can be achieved depends on how sharp and long
the current recession becomes. Certainly recent losses
have been massive (Manuelyan and Walton 1998). But
the growth fundamentals continue to hold promise for
the future.
Figure 4: Required and predicted per capita growth with improved policies to reduce poverty by
half (% p.a.)
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dicted to achieve the Strategy 21 goal. Some coun-
tries (including, significantly, Brazil and a number
of African countries - for example, Uganda and
Zambia - where poverty is particularly severe)
would not reach the target even if they enjoyed the
average effects of 'good' policies, either because of
disadvantageous initial conditions or high required
per capita growth (Table 6).
The predicted growth scenarios therefore suggest
that under existing policies, the Strategy 21 goal
will be reached in countries representing 86% of the
world's population. If policies are improved, this
figure increases to only just over 90%. Of course,
the increase in the number of countries achieving
the goal is much greater (from 18 to 28).
1Jndonesia 0
:
China yenya
.
s
e
Zambia
Required per capita growth to reduce poverty by half (% pa)
Table 6: Countries that reach the poverty reduction goal under different scenarios
e
These predictions are only as robust as the underly-
ing regression model. They are conditioned on a
host of factors: on income distributions remaining
unchanged; on an unchanging investment to GOP
ratio; on the parameters estimated by Sachs and
Warner being stable over time. No single equation
will be able to capture the complex interactions
involved in determining growth outcomes in the
variety of countries we have covered. But the exper-
iment is a worthwhile one. It gives some order of
magnitude on the effect of good policies in enhanc-
ing growth, and in making the Strategy 21 poverty
reduction goal that much easier to attain.
So far all the predictions have assumed that income
distributions will not change over the prediction
Countries that
reach target on:
Average per capita growth rate
Required Lower Higher
Population
(millions)
Countries
(number)
Existing policies 1.14 2.74 3.28 2,743 18
Improved policies 1.68 0.79 2.73 186 10
Neither 3.21 0.90 2.12 231 8
Source: Authors' calculations
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Table 7: Effects of change in inequality on required growth rates to halve poverty over 25 years
Source: Ravallion and Chen 1998
period. While distributions tend to be stable, when
they do shift this can have significant effects on
poverty In the late 1980s, China was growing fast
with little or no effects on poverty, owing to rises in
inequality To explore the consequences of changes,
we report in Table 7 the results of an exercise that
assumes the distribution of a few countries' shifts to
the pattern observed in other countries." (This is
preferable to making arbitrary changes in the pattern
of income distribution.) If China experienced a fur-
ther increase in inequality to the level and structure
prevailing in Malaysia (in 1989), the required per
capita growth rate to reduce poverty by half would
rise by almost half a percentage point at one dollar a
day, and almost one percentage point at two dollars a
day A similar result is found for Nigeria, if it were to
become as unequal as South Africa. The fact that the
relationship is not simple is illustrated by exploring
the effects of India becoming as unequal as Ecuador:
this would require a faster growth rate at one dollar a
day, but actually slower at two dollars a day Finally,
we explore the benefits of reduced inequality in two
of the most unequal countries in the world: Brazil
and South Africa, assuming the degree of inequality
shifted to that prevailing in Colombia and Thailand
respectively (both also quite unequal, but much less
so). In both cases the required growth rate in con-
sumption per head is significantly reduced (Table 7).
These results clearly show that both growth and
distribution matter for the pace of poverty decline,
and for the achievability of the Strategy 21 goals for
poverty reduction. Policies to support efficient
"These results come from Ravallion and Chen (1998).
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redistribution are clearly of great interest - along
with policies that promote growth - but are rela-
tively poorly understood. Strategies that involve
priority to rural development, integration of lagging
regions, inclusive education systems, rapid growth
in labour demand, and relatively pro-poor overall
tax and spending structures will all tend to support
redistribution (and growth), but there is much
more work to be done in this area.
4 Social Goals and Income
Growth
The core social targets relate to mortality, education
and gender gaps in school enrolments. Achieving
these targets is an important end in itself. The
capacity to live a healthy life and to read and write
represents an enhancement of human capabilities,
while eliminating differences in education between
men and women improves social justice (though it
may sometimes be in conflict with cultural norms).
There are also two-way relationships between
human capabilities and social and economic
change. Economic advance can cause social
progress, notably through increased public and pri-
vate spending out of rising income on factors that
improve social conditions. Better health and educa-
tion can also raise productivity Finally, there are
important iflter-relationships between social condi-
tions: most importantly better education for women
has a powerful influence on improving child health
and reducing fertility, independent of income
(Caldwell 1986).
No change Change in inequality to
Required per capita Required per capita
growth rate tevel growth rate
Country Gini $1/day $2/day prevailing in: Gini $1/day $2/day
China 41.5 1.4 1.9 Malaysia 48.4 1.8 2.8
India 33.8 1.4 5.0 Ecuador 46.6 2.4 4.1
Nigeria 45.0 2,2 3.0 South Africa 58.4 2.5 4.0
Brazil 61.5 2.5 3.1 Colombia 51.3 1.4 2.2
South Africa 58.4 1.4 2.7 Thailand 46.2 0.3 1.5
Because of the inter-relationship between social and
economic advance, it is important to explore the
links between the various targets. We undertake an
exploratory exercise on this with respect to child
mortality, though a similar approach could be
applied to other social targets. The target for child
mortality is for a two-thirds reduction by 2015 (rel-
ative to 1990 levels). Mortality rates are country-
wide averages, and the mortality of the poor (in
terms of consumption) is systematically higher than
the average; i.e. poverty and mortality, as well as
other social indicators, are significantly related to
each other within countries. However, under most
conditions, reductions in overall mortality are
highly correlated with reductions in mortality
among the poor.
To explore the future we use the following results
from analysis of the past:
There is a well-established relationship between
GDP per capita and infant and child mortality,
with an elasticity of about 0.6 from cross-sec-
tional results and from analysis of very long
time series (Filmer and Pritchett 1997; Pritchett
1997). Shorter time series' results find lower
elasticities: Pritchett and Summers (1996)
obtain an elasticity of about 0.2 of infant mor-
tality with respect to income for five-year peri-
ods, rising to about 0.4 for periods of three
decades (with little evidence that the elasticity is
different for different initial starting points of
mortality and incomes).
Other development-related factors also affect
mortality, with greater female education lower-
ing child mortality, and more unequal income
distribution - whether a country is predomi-
nantly Muslim - and greater ethnolinguistic
fractionalisation, tending to raise child mortal-
ity (Filmer and Pritchett 1997)12
Mortality has been steadily improving in all
countries, even after controlling for incomes
and education, and there is some evidence that
this has accelerated since 1960 to a rate of
about 1.5% per annum (Pritchett 1997).
'Anand and Ravallion (1993) conclude that only the
incomes of the poor have a significant effect on infant
and mortality
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The results of a simple, illustrative projection exer-
cise are shown in Figure 5. The top line gives the
1995 under-five child mortality rate for a number
of countries, ranked in order of rising mortality
The bottom line gives the Strategy 21 goal for
2015 (of a two-thirds reduction from the 1990 lev-
els). We then project the levels of child mortality
for the countries in a series of steps. First we pro-
ject the effects of the underlying trend reduction of
mortality of 1.5% per annum before accounting
for income or other effects. This is assumed to be
the same for all countries, since there does not
appear to be evidence of systematic differences in
this trend in the recent past. We then introduce
the additional effects of the projected rise in
female education, using the coefficient from the
cross-sectional analysis in Filmer and Pritchett
(1997). Other variables, such as inequality, are
assumed not to change or influence the pace of
change in this projection. As it happens, the incre-
mental effect of rising female education on the
projected country average is small - an issue that
differs from some of the micro results, that will
require further exploration. This net result of both
the time trend and increased female education
(implicitly assuming zero growth in per capita
income) is shown in the second line from the top.
This gives the first result:
on the basis of the past underlying trend and
projected rises in education (but before per
capita income growth) child mortality will fall
significantly, but only to a level of about double
that of the Strategy 21 goal by 2015.13
Next we add in the effects of the growth in per
capita income, using the medium-term elasticity of
0.4 and the two growth scenarios developed in the
previous section. These are shown in the final two
lines of Figure 5. Note that in some cases the mor-
tality rate under the lower-growth scenario is actu-
ally higher than under the simple trend projection,
owing to negative projected real per capita income
growth under this scenario. This gives the second
result:
growing incomes are a significant source of
mortality decline, over and above the trend
This is an unweighted average of child mortality rate
in the projections and the Strategy 21 goal.
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Table 8: Under-5 mortality rates: actual and projected under alternative scenarios
Country Under-5 Strategy 21
mortality Goal
1995
Time trend
plus effect of
increased
female
education
growth and effects of rising female education;
but even under the higher growth scenario,
projected mortality in 2015 is, on average, over
60% above the Strategy 21 goal.
Specific results for selected countries are shown in
Table 8. For the countries shown, the time trend
(plus increased female education) reduces the
child mortality rate to a level that is about 100%
higher than the Strategy 21 goal. Further reduc-
lions occur under the alternative growth scenarios:
for the higher growth case this ranges from reduc-
ing to a level of 68% above the Strategy 21 goal for
Brazil, to 40% above for Indonesia.
These scenarios are illustrative of what might occur
based on past experience. They do not make any
specific assumptions on actions, but they do
implicitly capture the effects of underlying
changes, in public and private action, that lie
behind both the time trend and income effects in
the past. While they are the product of a very sim-
ple aggregate projection methodology, they do at
least illustrate the scale of the overall task, that
there is a lot we do not know about aggregate
changes (caught in the time trend) and the impor-
tance of income growth for mortality This initial
exercise suggests that achieving the Strategy 21
goals for child mortality would either require sig-
nificantly faster income growth, or actions that
would cause an independent acceleration of the
pace of mortality improvement. We turn next to
the issue of direct public action.
Lower-
income
growth
scenario
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Higher-
income
growth
scenario
Time trend
plus effect of
increased
female
education
Lower-
income
growth
scenario
Higher-
income
growth
scenario
5 Public Action and Public
Spending to Reach the Social Goals
What can governments and donors do to help reach
the social targets? Public spending is centre stage in
the 20/20 initiative, for example, which proposes
that at least 20% of government spending and
donor support should go to basic services (such as
primary health, primary education, clean water).
Part of the answer is that both public and private
actions are hidden behind the projection. Rising
incomes underpin increased public and private
spending on education and health. Increased edu-
cation for women increases household investments
in children. But there is surely a case for increased
discretionary spending by governments (and
donors). While most practitioners believe this, the
evidence is more ambiguous: the nature of public
(and societal) action can make a major difference to
social outcomes; but the answer does not lie in
increased spending alone. Improving the policy and
institutional framework for social service delivery
and use is often of equal or greater importance.
Two types of evidence, again focusing on health,
frame the issue. First, despite the robust overall
relationship between incomes and health, there are
some societies that have experienced unusually
good or poor outcomes for their level of income.
For example, China, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica
and Kerala State in India are all frequently cited as
having unusually low mortality rates for their
income levels (see, for example, Dreze and Sen
1996, World Bank 1990). Indeed, the mortality of
African-Americans in the US is comparable with
that of Chinese and Keralans, despite hugely higher
Brazil 57 20 41 40 34 101 97 68
India 95 34 69 59 50 103 72 47
Indonesia 75 27 54 38 38 102 40 40
Kenya 90 32 66 58 49 103 78 52
Zambia 180 65 132 117 100 105 81 55
Projected under-5 mortality
in 2015 Ratio to Strategy 21 goal
(per 1,000 live births) (%)
mean incomes. This is clear evidence for the effec-
tiveness of different societies in improving social
outcomes through public or private behaviour at
very different income levels. And since average
mortality rates would be expected to be particularly
sensitive to those of the poor, the average results
also suggest much better outcomes for the poor.
Second, however, there is mixed (cross-section) evi-
dence that public spending on overall health or on pri-
mary health services is associated with better health
outcomes. On the one hand, some studies find evi-
dence of a positive association between public
spending on health and better health outcomes
(Anand and Ravallion 1993), and that outcomes for
the poor are also favourably affected (Bidani and
Ravallion 1997). On the other hand, Filmer and
Pritchett (1997) find that incomes alone 'explain'
84% of mortality differences between countries;
incomes plus a set of socioeconomic variables
'explain' 95%; while differences in public spending
alone explain only an additional 0.15%. The socioe-
conomic variables include female education (which
reduces child mortality), inequality, ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation, and whether a country is predomi-
nantly Muslim (all of which increase mortality). The
differences in these empirical results are likely to be
due to the inclusion of this set of socioeconomic vari-
ables in Filmer and Pritchett, and their exclusion in
Anand/Ravallion and Bidani/Ravallion. Once these
factors are included, the statistical role of public
spending appears to be weak.
A good outcome is frequently associated with
favourable conditions with respect to the other
socioeconomic variables: China has high female
education, low inequalïty, and low ethno-Iinguistic
diversity There remain significant good and bad
outcomes, even after controlling for all these vari-
ables, but there is no clear relationship with public
spending on health. Indeed the average spending of
the top ten performers (after controlling for
incomes and socio-economic variables) at 2.0% of
GDP, is very similar to that of the worst ten per-
formers, at 1.8% of GDP Brazil has an unusually
high child mortality for its income level, at 83 per
thousand, and spends 3% of GDP of public money
on health. Sri Lanka has an unusually good out-
come of 35 per thousand and spends just 1.7% of
GDR There is wide variation amongst good and bad
performers.
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The result that public spending is a poor predictor of
good health is a common one (see Musgrove 1996).
Is it because governments have failed to heed the
advice of advocates of primary health care, and redis-
tribute resources to preventive and basic curative ser-
vices? This is probably true in some cases. And it is a
standard result of analyses of the distributional inci-
dence of services that public spending on the primary
health services (e.g. rural clinics) and primary school-
ing, are much more equally distributed than those on
secondary and tertiary services, that are characteristi-
cally skewed to better off households. But unfortu-
nately there is little evidence that increased spending
on primary health, or proximity to basic health ser-
vices is associated with better health outcomes
(Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett 1997).
How can this be interpreted? There are indeed wide
differences in the efficacy of public action. But these
are only weakly, if at all, associated with different
levels or patterns of public spending. Much more
important is the effectiveness of public - and pri-
vate - actions. Kerala has highly effective public
action with public services that have significant
benefits for the poor, combined with effective
household action. High levels of education, espe-
cially of women, have direct impacts on household
behaviour, and are probably associated with more
effective community and state action. Uttar Pradesh
has public services of very low quality with little
impact on the poor, exacerbated by low levels of
education, in part a product of weak action in the
education sector (Drze and Sen 1996). Cear, in
northeast Brazil, that generally has a dismal child
mortality record, succeeded in bringing about a
sharp reduction in mortality through a highly effec-
tive campaign (Tendler and Freedheim 1994).
The issue of the effectiveness of public services is also
shown in the behaviour of the poor. For both health
and education, the poor will bypass low quality pub-
lic services and pay for higher quality This is common
in the health sector (Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett
1997). And the poor will respond to reforms that raise
quality (Alderman and Lavy 1996). One study of pri-
mary (largely curative) health service reforms that
introduced changes raising quality and user charges,
found that it was the poor that had the largest
response in increased use of services (Litvack and
Bodart 1993). This is in spite of the fact that it is well-
established that the poor are more price sensitive
because of the lower incomes: the increase in price
was more than offset by the improvement in quality
What this implies is that an over-preoccupation with
public spending can be misleading. There is some, if
limited, evidence that public spending on basic edu-
cation and health is good for the poor and, as noted,
most incidence studies find that spending on pri-
mary schools and primary health facilities are much
more pro-poor (though rarely fully egalitarian) than
spending at secondary and tertiary levels (that can
be very regressive). But this will often be of second-
order importance to institutional and policy reforms
to increase the overall effectiveness and coverage of
services. How to do that is a highly complex ques-
tion, and will vary greatly from society to society In
particular some have the overall societal conditions
that generate highly effective public services, while
others do not. Nevertheless, at the risk of over-sim-
plification a few points can be made:
It makes eminent sense to finance basic educa-
tion and those health activities that the private
sector would under-provide (for example, vec-
tor control and infectious diseases, that tend to
hit the poor disproportionately).
In both education and health there is a case for
allowing multiple providers, whether from the
private sector or NGOs.
In both, there is a case for increasing the influ-
ence of parents, communities or individuals
who use the services, for example, through giv-
ing parents a greater say in spending choices
and hiring decisions (as is occurring, for exam-
ple, in parts of Pakistan).
In many areas, it is important to develop mech-
anisms for participatory design and monitoring,
as well as objective mechanisms for assessing the
actual impact of interventions on poor house-
holds that will allow the continual re-design of
activities.
6 Conclusion
This article has explored the attainability of the
poverty and social goals in the OECD's Shaping the
2 ist Century The answer as to whether these goals
can be achieved is, not surprisingly, 'lt depends.'
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But evidence from the past provides guidance on
the way in which it depends. The principal results
were as follows:
Reaching the goal of halving poverty incidence
by 2015 depends on the initial poverty level,
the initial distribution of income and changes in
distribution over time. Even with distribution-
ally neutral growth, there are wide variations in
per capita growth rates required to reach the
target - in general the more initially unequal,
and the higher the poverty incidence, the
higher the required growth.
If countries grow at rates prevailing in the early
1990s, or if we project performance on the
basis of current policy and structural condi-
tions, many will not achieve the poverty reduc-
tion goal; and if there are increases in inequality
the situation is likely to be made worse.
If, however, poor-performing countries were to
achieve the overall policy and institutional per-
formance of fast-growing countries, then the
majority are predicted to achieve the required
growth.
The achievement of social goals is intimately
linked with poverty goals - there is evidence of
two-way causation between incomes and social
outcomes and from social conditions to income
growth; however, even with high growth, past
levels of progress would lead to child mortality
rates still substantially above the Strategy 21
goal for 2015.
Incomes and other socioeconomic factors -
notably women's education - are generally much
more important than public spending in
explaining differences in mortality; in both edu-
cation and health, variations in outcomes are
more importantly explained by differences in
the efficacy of public action than in levels of
public spending. In addition to ensuring that
sufficient budgetary provision is made for good
quality basic services, increasing attention must
be paid to other critical factors which govern
outcomes. It will often be as important (if not
more so) to focus on the policy and institutional
reforms necessary for well-functioning social
sectors.
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